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As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the
scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors or to inventors in order to give the public
appropriate access to their work product. Because this
task involves a difficult balance between the interests of
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation
of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and
society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand, our
patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.'

Under the authority of Article I, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, Congress has continuously
struggled with the task of molding our nation's
copyright laws to adapt to rapid changes in technology. 2 Since Congress passed the first Copyright
Act in 1909, 3 laws have developed in response to
innovations in radio, television and video without
causing fatal damage to their respective industries
* This article was written, and its analysis and conclusions
based on the state of the law just prior to a Feb. 12, 2001
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision. On Feb. 12, a threejudge Ninth Circuit panel decided that the scope of U.S.
District Court Judge Marilyn Patel's preliminary injunction
was "overbroad" and directed the district court to enter a
modified preliminary injunction. A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., No. 00-16401/403, 2001 WL 115033, at *24
(9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2001). Although Napster is permitted to
stay in business until such time, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
the district court that the RIAA presented a prima facie case
that Napster users committed direct copyright infringement.
Id. at *8. However, Napster may also be held liable for
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, an issue
to be more thoroughly developed at a full trial on the merits
of the case. Id. at *13.
1 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) (discussing the factors Congress must consider when enacting copyright laws). Congress must consider
whether the legislation stimulates the producer so as to benefit the public and then determine whether the interest in the
temporary monopoly would be outweighed by any benefit
conferred on the public. Id. at 429 n.10.
2
Id. at 428; U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl. 8 (providing in part
that "Congress shall have the Power... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their

or markets. 4 Businesses, although hesitant, have
revamped long-standing business models in order
to remain competitive. 5 However, no enterprise
has felt more threatened by technological advances than the entertainment industry. 6 The music and film industries both have been reluctant to
embrace new modes of distributing entertainment content.7 The recurring result has been for
these industries to bring numerous lawsuits in the
name of copyright protection trying to quell
emerging technology.8 Digitization of copyrighted
music and movies, the introduction of the Internet and the increasing popularity of peer-topeer file sharing over the World Wide Web are no
exception. 9 The ease with which Internet users
can copy and download digital files has put both
the Motion Picture Association of America

respective Writings and Discoveries").
3
Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1994 & Supp. V
1999)).
4
Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning In: The Future of Copyright Protectionfor Online Music in the Digital Millennium, 68
L. REV. 2445 (2000) [hereinafter Pollack].
Michael S. Malone, Let the Pirates Go, SILICON INSIDER, at
5

FORDHAM

http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/business/SiliconInsider/SiliconInsider_- 000627.html Uune 27, 2000) (discussing the development and illegal uses of the cable television
industry, and the inevitability of a digital black market).
6 James Lardner, The Empire Strikes Back To Fight Pirates,
the Entertainment Biz Deploys Technology as Well as Lawyers, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 18, 2000, at 56, availableat http://

www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/00918/digital.html [hereinafter Lardner] (discussing the entertainment industries
"ongoing legal war against pirates and freeloaders").
7 Charles L. Simmons, Jr., DigitalDistribution of Entertainment Content ... The Battle Lines are Drawn, 33 Mo. B.J. 32

(2000) [hereinafter Simmons].
8

See Fred Moody, Online Music Swapping Rocks: Tuning in

to the Techno Beat, at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/
tech/FredMoody/moody.html (Sept. 2, 2000) (discussing
the reluctance of the music industry to embrace technology
due to greed).
9 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2445.
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("MPAA") I0 and the Recording Industry of Association of America ("RAA") II at risk of potentially
losing billions of dollars to hackers and pirates
over the distribution of digital content.' 2 On the

other hand, websites and Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")1 3 that facilitate the distribution and

downloading of music and videos over the Internet find themselves in the gray areas of copyright law. 14 The ultimate effect of the threat of
copyright lawsuits could stifle rising online ven5

tures. 1

Congress, in response to such tensions, passed
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
("DMCA") 1 6 "to insure that copyrighted content
would continue to be protected by copyright law
in the digital environment, but also sought the
flexibility necessary to allow ... Internet techno-

log[ies] and businesses to flourish while making
copyright content available."' 7 The MPAA and the
RLAA have recently tested the limits of the DMCA
in two groundbreaking cases. The MPAA challenged the unauthorized copying and distribution
of copyrighted movies on digital versatile disks
("DVD") over the Internet, and the RIAA contested the unauthorized downloading of compressed music files known as MP3s. i8 The potential piracy problems result from the fact that CDs
and MP3 files do not presently contain encryption
technology to protect against the unauthorized
copying of music content.' 9 While DVDs do con10 The eight major motion picture corporations in the
association include Universal City Studios, Inc., Paramount

Pictures Corp., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., Tristar
Pictures Inc., Columbia Pictures, Inc., Time Warner, Co.,
L.P., Disney Enterprises, Inc. and Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. Simmons, supra note 7, at 32.
''

The main members of the RIAA that control 92% of

all music sold in the United States include, UMG Recordings,
Inc., Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., Warner Bros. Records,
Inc., Arista Records, Inc., Atlantic Recording Corp., BMG d/
b/a The RCA Records Label, Capital Records, Inc., Elektra
Entertainment Group, Inc., Interscope Records and Sire
Records Group, Inc. Id.
12
Benton J. Gaffney, Copyright Statutes that Regulate Technology: A ComparativeAnalysis of The Audio Home Recording Act
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 75 WASH. L. Ri, v. 611,
629 (2000) [hereinafter Gaffney] (arguing that "the ease of
copying and distributing digital works also encourages unauthorized sharing of copyrighted works among private individ-

uals").
13 For the purpose of this article Internet Service Provider shall be referred to as "ISP." An ISP is defined by The

Digital Millennium Copyright Act as "an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified
by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modifi-
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tain this technology, hackers have been able to
easily discover the codes that descramble their security protection and subsequently post the
decryption program on the Internet. 20 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,2 a federal district
court judge enjoined a hacker website from the
posting and linking of computer code used to
descramble DVD encryption technology protection. On the other hand, the RJAA has not been
as successful. In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 22 a circuit court of appeals judge stayed the
injunction ordered by 'the district court that
would have shut down Napster, a company that
facilitates the free transfer of MP3 music record23
ing files over the Internet.
In looking at the history of our copyright law
and the DMCA, this note will demonstrate that
the district court decisions in both the Reimerdes
and Napster test cases are simply temporary restraining walls against the unauthorized copying
and distribution of copyrighted music and film
content over the Internet. 24 Once these cases are
decided, the entertainment industry must then
determine whether or not they wish to catch up
with technology and adjust the ways they do business. 25 Although the MPAA has a good chance of
succeeding on appeal, the RLAA case is less clear
because of the greater implications of legal peerto-peer file swapping and our countries' goal of
fostering revolutionary technologies over the Incation to the content of the material as sent or received." 17
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
14 David Segal, MP3.com Loses Court Ruling, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 7, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Segal].
15
Id.
16 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 512 and in various sections of Chapter 12 of Title
17 of the U.S.C.).
17 The Future of Digital Music: Is There an Upside to
Downloading?Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong., at
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/7112000_ogh.htm (2000)
(testimony of Senator Orin G.Hatch) [hereinafter Hearings].
18 Simmons, supra note 7, at 32.
19 Id. at 33.
20
Id.
21
111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
22
Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403, 2000 WL 1055915 (9th
Cir. July 28, 2000).
23
Id.
24
Simmons, supra note 7, at 37.
25
Id.; Kimberly D. Richard, The Music Industry and its Digital Future: IntroducingMP3 Technology, 40 IDEA: J.L. & TECH.
426, 430 (2000) ("Court decisions affecting music distribution could certainly pave the way for the digital distribution
of videos and movies, among other things, once the technology has sufficiently evolved.").
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ternet. 26 Regardless of the entertainment industries' success or failure, it will inevitably be up to
the RIAA and the MPAA to adapt their models of
distributing copyrighted content to work with the
Internet, not against it.
This note examines the copyright debate over
the distribution of digital entertainment content
over the Internet and the recent trend of judicial
decisions that strengthen the law in favor of copyright holders. First, this note discusses the reproduction of music and video content and the introduction of digital technology. Part II illustrates
the background of copyright law, the theories of
copyright infringement and the fair use affirmative defense to infringement. Part III explores the
ways in which the DMCA has strengthened copyright law, and how it effects the entertainment industry and ISPs. Part IV of this note recounts the
district court's opinion in the Reimerdes case under
Title I of the DMCA and the district court's opinion in the Napster case under Title II of the
DMCA. Part V assesses the district court's decision
to preliminarily enjoin Napster from facilitating
the free transfer of MP3 files over the Internet
and the effect it could have on other file-sharing
technologies. Utilizing the aforementioned discussions, this note concludes with an analysis of
the implications of the Reimerdes and Napster decisions on the future of copyright law, and the unauthorized copying and distribution of digital entertainment content in cyberspace.

I.

REPRODUCTION OF MUSIC AND VIDEO
CONTENT AND THE INTRODUCTION OF
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY

The digitization of music and film content from
its previous analog 27 format has revolutionized
26

Hearings,supra note 17 (testimony of Senator Orin G.

Hatch).
27 "Analog" is generally defined as "designating or of
electronic, recordings, etc. in which the signal corresponds
to a physical change, as sound to a groove in a phonograph

record." Elizabeth R. Grosse, Recording Industy Association of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.: The RIAA Could
Not Stop the Rio-MP3 Files and The Audio Home Recording Act,
34 U.S.F. L. REv. 575, 577 n.18 (2000) [hereinafter Grosse]

(citing

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD

DICTIONARY

385 (3d. ed.

1994)) (noting that examples of analog recordings include

audio cassette tapes and video cassette tapes).
28
29
30

Simmons, supra note 7, at 33.
Id.
Gaffney, supra note 12, at 630 n.129 (reasoning, how-

the way the entertainment industry distributes
their copyrighted products to consumers. 2 The
digital medium is now the standard for releasing
new and existing content. 29 As the unauthorized
reproduction of analog audiocassettes and videocassettes posed a threat to the entertainment industry in the 1980s, the new digital formats create
30
similar concerns.
A.

The Sony Betamax Video Tape Recorder
("VTR") and the Emergence of DVDs

The initial threat to the entertainment industry
over the unauthorized copying of video content
arose in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios.3 1 In Sony, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the sale of the Sony VTR for home taping and
later private viewing of copyrighted television
broadcasts constituted a "fair use." 32 Because copyright holders do not posses exclusive rights to
their works; individuals may reproduce copyrighted works without permission if it is done so
in a fair or reasonable manner. 33 The Court further held that "a manufacturer is not liable for the
sale of a 'staple article of commerce' that is 'capable of commercially significant [or substantial]
noninfringing uses.' "34 Sony is the landmark case
that ultimately laid out what is now known as the
common law fair use and staple article of commerce doctrines, both of which are affirmative defenses to copyright infringement imposing the
35
burden of proof on the defendant infringer.
Approximately fifteen years after the Sony decision, in the mid-1990s, the digitization of video
content from their original videocassette tapes
emerged on the market. 36 The film industry currently distributes most of their copyrighted movies in digital format on DVDs, which can be
ever, that just as the movie industry's fears that VCRs would
"eliminate the demand for movies in theaters" proved unfounded, "it may turn out that fears of digital technology...
may also prove unfounded").
3-1 464 U.S. at 417.
312

Id. at 442.

33

Id.
Id.

34

'5
Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window Onto the
Future of Copyright Law in the Internet Age, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 755, 764 (2000) [hereinafter Berschadsky]; see also Pollack, supra note 4, at 2459 (discussing the fair
use affirmative defense to online copyright infringement).
3-6 Simmons, supra note 7, at 32 (discussing digital video
technology).
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played and viewed on home DVD playersA7 and
computer hard drives.38 An encryption-based system, known as Content Scrambling System
("CSS"), protects these motion pictures from being decrypted, and copied or viewed on non-CSSlicensed DVD players.39 The digital sound and
graphic files that are encrypted on CSS-protected
DVDs can only be decrypted by an "appropriate
decryption algorithm that employs a series of keys
stored on the DVD and DVD players." 40 Conse-

quently, only CSS-protected players and drives
containing the appropriate keys can decrypt and
play the secured DVD files. 4 1 Manufacturers of
compliant DVD playing devices are given licenses,
subject to an administrative fee, on a royalty-free
basis. 42 Although DVDs can be copied without

degradation from generation to generation, the
unauthorized copying and distribution of DVDs
tends to pose less of a threat to the film industry
than did the Sony VTR because DVDs do not contain sophisticated compression technology." 3
Thus, the digital transfer of full-length feature
films takes up large amounts of hard drive space,
and copying is less feasible due to huge download
44
and transfer times.

B.

Compact Disks ("CDs"), The Digital Audio
Tape ("DAT") and MP3s

Like the film industry, one of the most significant advances for the recording industry has been
the digitization of music content. 45 The CD was
the first commercially successful digital medium,
providing consumers with a much clearer sound
than the older analog technology. 46 Unlike DVDs,

CDs have never been encrypted with technology
37 DVD players are the functional equivalent to VCRs
that play analog videocassette tapes, but DVD players are
used to play DVDs viewed on television screens. See, e.g.,
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
38

DVDs, also know as CD-ROMs, are five-inch wide opti-

cal disks that can also be read and played on a computer's
five-inch wide CD-ROM drive and viewed on computer
screens. See id. at 307, 310.
39
Id. at 308 (explaining the development of CSS).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42

Id.

Simmons, supra note 7, at 33; see aLo Reimerdes, II1 F.
Supp. 2d at 308.
44 Simmons, supra note 7, at 33.
45 Id. at 32.
46
Id. (discussing that like DVDs, CDs can be copied with43
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to protect against the unauthorized copying and
distribution of copyrighted music. 47 Initially, copying digitally copyrighted music to cassette tapes,
using analog recording devices, produced lower
sound quality that deteriorated after each successive reproduction. 48 In the early 1980s, a few years
after CDs were introduced, the DAT recorder became commercially available to consumers. 49 The

recording industry was concerned with DAT recordings because, unlike the inferior analog quality copies, the DAT created perfect copies of copyrighted music.

51°

An even greater threat to copyright protection
in the recording industry is the more recent introduction of the MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 or MP3. 5 1
MP3 is a digital compression technology that allows audio recordings to be compressed into files
that can easily be downloaded on personal com52
Computers or transferred over the Internet.

pressed MP3 files are attractive because, as opposed to the transfer of DVDs, they use little
memory, and require little download or transfer
time. 53 As with DVD files transferred over the Internet, MP3 files retain CD-quality sound. 54 Users
can upload CDs to their computers by using "ripping" software, which makes it possible to encode
them into MP3 format and then transfer the files
over the Internet. 55 Users also can quickly
download already compressed MP3 files from the
Internet onto their computer hard drives or
"burn" them onto CDs. 56 The problem remains

that a majority of MP3 files were never authorized
by their owners to be available in digital format
over the Internet. 57 Like CDs, MP3s do not contain copyright management information. Thus,
there is no protection from the free unauthorized
out degradation from each generation).
47 Id. at 33.
48
Grosse, supra note 27, at 578 (discussing digital and
analog recording devices).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 578-79.
51
Pollack, supra note 4, at 2449.
52
Id. (discussing MP3 technology).
53
Id. at 2450.
54
Id. at 2449.
55
A&M Recordings, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d
896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing MP3 technology).
56
See id. "Burning" refers to the process by which music
files from a computer hard drive are encoded onto CDs. See
id.
57
Grosse, supra note 27, at 581 (discussing the piracy
problem).
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use, copying or distribution of the recordings. 58
Despite its enormous potential for copyright infringement, the MP3 format is quickly becoming
the standard for the digital distribution of music. 59

C.

The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
("AHRA") 60 and the Diamond Multimedia6 1

Decision
With the advent of DVDs and MP3s, the entertainment industry felt threatened by these new
methods by which people could make perfect
copies of video and music recordings. 62 In October 1992, reacting to the Sony decision and the arrival of the DAT recorder in the home consumer
market, Congress enacted the AHRA.653 The
AHRA was designed to protect consumers from
copyright infringement liability for private, noncommercial taping of copyrighted audio or video
recordings while at the same time also protecting
copyright owners from piracy.6 4 The AHRA accomplishes this goal by requiring anyone who
manufactures, imports or distributes a digital recording device to pay a royalty that goes into a
general fund that is distributed to copyright owners to make up for lost revenues. 65 Such recording
devices also are required to implement a Serial
Copyright Management System ("SCMS"), an encoding technology that prevents the device's ability to create copies of any works it records (i.e.,
making copies of a copy). 66

The AHRA was tested in June 1999 when the
RAA sued to enjoin Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. from manufacturing and distributing its
Rio Player in Recording Industry Ass'n of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. 67 The Rio player allows users to download MP3 files from a computer
hard drive and store them on a memory card. 68
58
59

Id. at 582.

61

Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Mul-

The files on the memory card can then be stored
on a portable device, and played and listened to
using headphones. 69 In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the AHRA did not
cover the Rio player and that personal computers
and MP3 files were exempted from regulation
under the AHRA. 70 The court further found that

the Rio did not qualify as a "digital audio recording device" because it only downloads MP3 files
from computer hard drives, and a hard drive is
neither a "digital music recording" nor a transmission thereof.7 Thus, Rio players were not capable
of creating "digital audio copied recording[s]"
within the meaning of the AHRA. 72 The Diamond

Multimedia suit was ultimately settled out of court
on undisclosed terms. 73 Yet, even if the Ninth Circuit had found that the AHRA applied to the Rio,
because MP3 files do not contain copyright management information, SCMS would have done little to stop the unauthorized copying of music re74
cordings.
As a result of the challenges of digital technology, the Secure Digital Music Initiative ("SDMI")
forum was launched in December of 1998 "to
bring together interested parties to develop technology specifications for protecting the distribution of digital media. '75 The forum's goal was to
create a single standard and clear rules for developing secure copyright technology that would be
incorporated into new digital playback devices
and programs. 76 The first phase of SDMI, set to

come out no earlier than the end of 2000, covers
both the sale and manufacturing of SDMI-compliant portable digital music players, which also
would be allowed to play unencrypted, non-SDMIcompliant, files. 77 The second phase of SDMI consists of issuing encryption technology and
watermarking 78 of SDMI-compliant music that

can only be played or copied on SDMI-compliant
66

Simmons, supra note 7, at 33.
60 Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1992)).
timedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
62
RebeccaJ. Hill, Pirates of the 21" Century: The Threat and
Promise of Digital Audio Technology on the Internet, 16 SANTA

&

180 F.3d at 1073.
68 Grosse, supra note 27, at 581 (describing Rio technology and how it works).
6;9 Id.

70
7'
72

L.J. 311, 324-25 (2000)

73

[hereinafter Hill].
63 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010; see also Hill, supra note 62, at
324-25.

74
75

CLARA COMPUTER

64

Grosse, supra note 27, at 580 (discussing the layout of

the AHRA).
65

HIGH TECH.

Id.

Id.

67

76

tions
77
78

Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1081.
Id. at 1076-78
Grosse, supra note 27, at 586.
Simmons, supra note 7, at 34.
Grosse, supra note 27, at 597.
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926 n.31.
Grosse, supra note 27, at 597-98 (discussing the soluto the MP3 piracy problem).
Id.; see also Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926 n.31.
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926 n.31 ("Watermarking
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devices. 79 Although encryption technology will
not affect existing CDs and MP3 files, encrypted
CDs and digital files will not work on existing CD
or software players.8 0 Consumers will either have
to purchase new SDMI-compliant CD players or
upgrade their computer software in order to listen to, copy or download encrypted music."' The
strictness with which SDMI presents to consumers
in their ability to gain access to copyrighted music
demands a look back at the original purpose of
our copyright laws.
II.

COPYRIGHT LAW THAT AFFECTS THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY AND ISPS
IN CYBERSPACE

A. The Background of the United States
Copyright Law
The need for copyright protection first
emerged in the colonial period as a response to
British censorship laws and the invention of the
printing press.8 2 Since the earliest days of our nation, copyright law has sought to balance the need
for freedom of expression with the desire to en-

sale of phone records and license fees.8

7

In the

case of actors and the MPAA, compensation
comes from the sale and rental of videos, movie
ticket sales and license fees.88 Profits from the
sale, distribution and reproduction of the works
are the primary motivating factor for artists to
make worthwhile their initial monetary and artistic investments in their respective industries.8 9
Traditional Theories of Copyright
Infringement: Direct, Contributory and
Vicarious Liability

B.

Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright holders are granted exclusive rights and are authorized to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, display and perform copyrighted
work publicly. 90 Copyright infringement occurs if
any of these exclusive rights are violated. 9 '
1. Direct Copyright Liability

"[ciopyright protection subsists . . . in original

A direct copyright infringer can be held directly
liable for actual physical infringement of a copyright holder's works. 92 Direct infringement occurs
if the copyright owner can prove: "(1) valid copyright ownership of a work; (2) the work was, in
fact, copied; and (3) the copying of work was ille-

works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium

gal under copyright laws." 93 The direct infringer's

courage

technological improvements.8

3

Today,

the Copyright Act of 197684 (the "Copyright Act"
or the "1976 Copyright Act") states that
'8 5
of expression, now known or later developed."

Generally, film and music copyrights are shared
between joint authors consisting of the actual musical artist or actor herself, and the music or film
producers.8 6 Recording artists and RLAA members
are compensated for their creative work from the
imbeds 'bits' or inaudible marks on content media; future
SDMI-compliant devices or software players will be able to
read the presence or absence of those bits and control copying accordingly.")
79
80

Grosse, supra note 27, at 598.

81

Id.

82

Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.12.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541-26012 (codified at

83
84

Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926 n.31.

17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
85 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994 & Stipp. V 1999).
86 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2453.
87 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 762.
88 John Jackson, Royalty Securitization: Taking Cabs to Bank-

ruptcy Court, 21 T.JEFFERSON L. REV. 209, 212 (2000) (discussing the cash flow assets that are available in the entertainment industry).
89 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 762; see also Naomi Abe

intent or knowledge is not an element that needs
to be proven under the Copyright Act. 94 A copyright owner can obtain both monetary damages
and injunctive relief as a result of the infringer's
95
absolute liability.

In UMG Recordings. v. MP3.com, Inc.,96 the deVoegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213,
1241 (1997) [hereinafter Voegtli] (discussing the incentive
factors that drive the entertainment industry).
90 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 764 (outlining the
framework of the Copyright Act); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 &

Supp. V 1999).

91 Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Comment, Seeking Shelter from
the MP3 Storm: How Far Does the DigitalMillenium Copyright Act
Online Service ProviderLiability Limitation Reach?, 7 COMMLAw
CONSPECTUS 423, 426 (1999) [hereinafter Markiewicz].
92
Id. at 426.
93 Id. at 427 (citing MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRiGHT L,\w § 9.20 (2d ed. 1995)).
94

i.

Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 764.
96 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing direct
liability as applied to online copyright infringement). The
RIAA filed the lawsuit against MP3.com on behalf of Universal Music Group and four other major RlAA members. While
95
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fendant MP3.com faces the largest fine ever im-

posed in a direct copyright infringement case if
not overturned on appeal. 9 7 In that case,
MP3.com purchased and copied thousands of
plaintiff RIAA's CDs and stored them on its servers. 98 Part of MP3.com's service, called
"My.MP3.Com," allowed users to log on and once
they "proved" 99 that they owned an original copy
of a recording in the defendant's database, the
user could access the music over the Internet
from any computer without having to insert the
original disk. 0 1 The district court judge found
that defendant MP3.com's "replaying for the subscribers converted versions of the recordings it
copied, without authorization from plaintiff's
copyrighted CDs," was a presumptive case for direct liability under the Copyright Act.' 0 1 The
judge later ruled that MP3.com "willfully" violated
copyright law and ordered defendant to pay
$25,000 per CD to RIAA for a total penalty of
roughly $118 million.' 0 2 The primary purpose of
the lawsuit was to send a very poignant message to
other music-sharing Internet services tempted to
break copyright law by offering free copies of
03
copyrighted works over the Internet.
2.

Contributory and Vicarious Copyright Liability

Third parties, such as ISPs, who do not actually
commit copyright infringement themselves can be
held indirectly liable for the copyright infringement of their users through theories of contributory or vicarious liability. 1 4 Although these theories of liability for copyright infringement are not

addressed in the Copyright Act, courts have long
recognized the need for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement liability. 1115 In order to
prevail on either of these two theories, a copyright
holder must first prove direct copyright infringement by a third party.' 0 6 Defendants can be held
liable for contributory copyright infringement if
the copyright owner proves that: "(1) a direct infringement occurred[;] (2) the defendant knew
or had reason to know of the infringing activity[;]
and (3) the defendant substantially participated
in the infringement by inducing, causing, or materially contributing to its occurrence."' 0 7 A defendant also can be held vicariously liable even if
he or she has no direct knowledge of the infringing activity.' 0 The plaintiff need only prove that
the defendant has "the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities."' 0 9 Both monetary damages and injunctive relief may be sought
for contributory and vicarious theories of liability.

110

C.

Affirmative Defense of Fair Use

The Sony fair use doctrine is now codified in
Section 107 of the Copyright Act' and provides
the following nonexclusive factors considered in
12
deciding a copyright infringement case:"
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of commercial nature or is for

nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

the other four labels settled out of court for an undisclosed
amount, Universal remained the sole plaintiff in the litigation. See Segal, supra note 14, at Al.
97
See Segal, supra note 14, at Al.
98 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
99
A subscriber can " 'prove' that he already owns the CD

Markiewicz, supra note 91, at 427.
Id. (discussing theories of contributory and vicarious
liability).
106 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
107
Pollack, supra note 4, at 2456.

version of the recording by inserting his copy of the commercial CD into his computer CD-ROM drive for a few
seconds . . . or [the subscriber] must purchase the CD from

E.g., Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
262 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding swap meet operator vicariously
liable for the activities of vendors who sold copyrighted music recordings). The operators were held vicariously liable because they had the right to terminate the vendors at will, and

one of defendant's cooperating online retailers." MP3.com,
92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
100 Segal, supra note 14, at Al.
101 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
102
UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 472
(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000)
(holding that the statutory damage award could be "more or
less depending on the number of qualifying CDs determined
at the final phase of the trial" and merely relied on defendants approximation of 4,700 CDs copied of plaintiff's copyrighted works).
103

Id.

104
105

108

Id.

109

they had a financial interest based on swap meet admission
fees and concession stand sales generated from swap meet
customers. Id.
110 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 765-66.
111 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
112

Pollack, supra note 4, at 2459 (laying out the frame-

work for the fair use defense). Recall that this doctrine allows
individuals to reproduce copyrighted works without permis-

sion if it is done so in a fair or reasonable manner. See Sony,
464 U.S. at 442.
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(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work. 1"3

The fair use affirmative defense is applied flexibly on a case-by-case basis. 1 1 4 All of the factors are
considered together in deciding whether a defendant violated copyright law.' 15 Generally, the doctrine allows a third party to copy or use a copyrighted work without the consent of the owner if
it is done in a fair or reasonable manner.' 16

III.

A.

THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
Background

Before the DMCA was enacted in 1998, ISPs
were sued frequently for contributory infringement based on the direct copyright infringement
of their users due to the difficulty of identifying
single copyright infringers.' 17 In December 1996,
two treaties were adopted from the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") conferences held in Geneva, the WIPO Copyright
Treaty", and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.' '1,These treaties were designed
to provide contracting nations, including the
United States, with effective legal protection for
authors of copyrighted works from digital piracy
over the Internet. 120 As a result of the WIPO, Congress enacted the DMCA. 12 1 Title I of the DMCA
implements the two WIPO treaties and prevents
the circumvention of technological measures protecting copyrighted works.1 22 Title II of the
DMCA, or the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, creates a safe harbor and
limits liability for ISPs from the unauthorized cop23
yright infringement by their users.'
''11
114
115

116
117

17 U.S.C. § 107 [hereinafter fair use factors].
Pollack, supra note 4, at 2459.
Id.
Hill, supra note 62, at 323.
Pollack, supra note 4, at 2456.

118 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty, Dec. 20,,1996, 36 I.L.M. 65.
119 World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograns Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
120
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 315-16 (discussing the
background of the DMCA).
121
Id.
122
17 U.S.C. § 1201-1205 (Supp. IV 1998).
123
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 (Supp. IV 1998)).
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B.

Title I of the DMCA adds a new Chapter 12 to
Title 17 of the U.S. Code.1 24 Section 1201 of the
Copyright Act is known as the anti-circumvention
provision. 2 5 Section 1201 (a)(1) prohibits the act
of circumventing a technological protection measure that controls access to a digital copyrighted
work.' 26 Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits "creating
and making available certain technologies ... developed or advertised to defeat technological pro27
tections against unauthorized access to a work."1
This section further provides that "no person shall
manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology"' 2 8 that (1)
is designed primarily to circumvent technology
that protects copyrighted works, (2) has limited
commercially significant uses other than circumvention, or (3) is purposely marketed for circumvention. 29 The exceptions to this section apply to
reverse engineering, encryption research, protection of personal identifying information, security
testing, certain analog devices and other government activities, as well as to use by educational institutions and law enforcement.'3 1

C.

Title II of the DMCA: The Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act

In 1998, Congress added Section 512 to Title 17
of the U.S. Code and incorporated it as Title II of
the DMCA, or The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act of the DMCA.' 3' Title II creates a safe harbor and limits the liability
of ISPs from copyright infringement that may pass
124

Brian Socolow and James R. Guerette, Digital Millen-

nium Copyright Act Interpreted, N.Y. LJ., July 24, 2000, at s7
(colA) [hereinafter Socolow] (discussing the framework of
Title I of the DMCA); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
125
Socolow, supra note 124; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
126
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (A) (Supp. IV 1998). This section prohibits "actual" circumvention and takes effect Oct.
28, 2000. See Pollack, supra note 4, at 2464.
127
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 105-551(1), at 18 (1998)); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
128
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
129
Pollack, supra note 4, at 2463 (discussing the Title I
anti-circumvention provision); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2)
(A)-(C).
130 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(k).
',1l
17 U.S.C. § 512.
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through their networks. 1 32 Title II targets actual
Internet users who violate copyright law by either
downloading or uploading the infringing material
without an artist's permission. 133 Under this title
of the DMCA, an ISP can avoid being shut down
by court order for copyright infringement and
can escape liability for money damages even if
they are found vicariously or contributorily liable
for copyright infringement.' 3 However, individual subscribers who commit infringing activity can
be restrained by court order from accessing the
35

service provider. 1

The safe harbor provision of Title II limits the
liability of an ISP in four distinct situations. 1 36
First, Section 512(a) on transitory digital network
communications, applies to a service provider
"transmitting, routing, or providing connections,
for material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider,
or by reason of the intermediate and transient
storage of that material in the course of such
transmitting, routing, or providing connections[.]' 1 37 A qualifying ISP under this section
must meet five additional conditions.' 3 1 Essentially, under this section, an ISP must be merely a
passive data "conduit" for the infringing material
13 9
being transferred through the ISP's network.
The second limitation on liability, found in Section 512(b), applies to system caching. 140 This section applies to intermediate or temporary storage
of Internet material on an ISP's server that may be
infringing.' 4 1 In order for an ISP to avail itself of
this safe harbor found in Section 512(b), the ISP
must not select, modify or otherwise interfere
with the information being stored temporarily on
14 2
its servers by a copyright infringer.
Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 767.
Pollack, supra note 4, at 2466.
134
Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 767.
135
17 U.S.C § 512(j) (B) (i).
136
Pollack, supra note 4, at 2465 (laying out the framework for the Title II safe harbor provision).
137 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).

The third safe harbor provision, Section 512(c),
limits the liability of an ISP for information residing on systems or networks at the direction of
users.' 43 This section applies as long as the ISP
does not have actual knowledge of or is aware of
facts and circumstances of the infringing activity,
and does not benefit financially from storing in14 4
fringing material on its system or network.
Once an ISP is made aware of a user's alleged
copyright infringement, the ISP must act "expeditiously to remove or disable access to [ ] the material that is claimed to be infringing."' 145 The last
section pertaining to ISP copyright liability, Section 512(d), applies to information location
tools. 14 6 As long as the same conditions found in

512(c) are met, an ISP will not be held liable
under Section 512(d) for money damages or for
injunctive sanctions for referring or linking to Internet locations that contain infringing material
by way of hyperlinks, online directories, search en1 47
gines or any other information location tools.
An important part of Title II is Section 512(n),

which states that subsections (a) and (b) describe
separate and distinct functions, and that the question of whether an ISP qualifies for a limitation on
liability is based solely on the criteria of those subsections and does not affect an ISP's potential lia148
bility under another subsection of the DMCA.
Finally, in order for an ISP to avail itself of the
safe harbor provisions of Section 512, an ISP must
"adopt and reasonably implement a policy that
provides for the termination of repeat infringers
from the system or network[,] and that accommodates and does not interfere with standard copyright protection measures in connection with its
system or network."' 49 The ISP must also register

132

vider in the course of such intermediate or transient
storage is maintained on the system or network in a
manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than

133

138

17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)-(5). Section 512(a) applies if:

(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or
at the direction of a person other than the service
provider;
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections,
or storage is carried out through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by
the service provider;
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of
the material except as an automatic response to the
request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service pro-

anticipated recipients ...; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or

network without modification of its content.
Id.
139

Pollack, supra note 4, at 2465.

140

14-3

17 U.S.C. § 512(b).
Pollack, supra note 4, at 2465.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).

144

Id. at § 512(c).

145

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).

146

17 U.S.C. § 512(d).

'41

142

147
148
149

Id. at § 512(d); see also Pollack, supra note 4, at 2466.
17 U.S.C. § 512(n).
Socolow, supra note 124, at s7; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
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a designated agent with the U.S. Copyright Office
to receive notifications of claimed copyright in-

ing of DeCSS on the Internet and sent websites
with DeCSS posted on them cease and desist let-

fringement by individual users. 151 If an ISP does

ters.' 5

not meet the safe harbor provision of Title II of
the DMCA, a court may issue a preliminary injunction if the complaining party can show probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or that the financial burden to
the ISP is outweighed by the harm imposed on
5
the copyright holder if no action is taken.' '

their requests, the MPAA filed a lawsuit against
Coley in January 2000, seeking to enjoin
2600.com from posting and later from the "electronic civil disobedience" of linking to other web158
sites that posted DeCSS technology on them.
1.

IV. THE MPAA AND RIAA PUT THE DMCA
TO THE TEST
A.

Title I of the DMCA: The Background of
Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes

In September 1999, a 15-year-old Norwegian
named Jon Lech Johansen and two unnamed individuals he met over the Internet produced
DeCSS, a program capable of descrambling CSS
or "decrypting" DVD encryption

codes.'

52

He

claimed that he created DeCSS, a Windows executable file, in order to use DVDs on his Linuxbased system, which did not support DVDs at the
time.'

53

Johansen then posted on his personal

website the DeCSS executable code, allowing nonlicensed computers to play complete movie files
and to copy decrypted files onto computer hard
drives.'

54

In November 1999, the defendants in

Reimerdes, 2600 Enterprises and owner Eric Corley, publisher of "The Hacker Quarterly," posted
the DeCSS source and object code on their website, 2600.com.'

55

At this website, users could

download DeCSS software directly or they could
link to other websites that posted DeCSS in order
to unscramble the CSS protection code. 156 In Oc-

tober 1999, the MPAA became aware of the postSocolow, supra note 124, at s7.
15' Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911; see also Berschadsky,
supra note 35, at 767.
152
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (noting that Norwe15o

gian prosecutors filed an action against Johansen in Jan.

1999 as a result of his creation of DeCSS).
'53

P.J. Connolly, Enterprise Toolbox: 'The Sharing' Debate:

When Source Code is Outlawed, Only Outlaws Will Have the Source
Code, INFOWORLD, Sept. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL
20918043 [hereinafter Connolly] (discussing new technologies and the file-sharing debate).
1'4 Id.
155
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09 (stating that in
the hacker community, Corley goes by the name of Emman-

uel Goldstein, the underground leader in George Orwell's
classic, 1984).
156

Id. at 311-12; see also id. at 309-10 (detailing how CSS

7

Because 2600.com did not comply with

The Parties' Contentions

In the Reimerdes case, the MPAA argued that defendant 2600.com's posting of DeCSS and linking
to other websites with DeCSS violated Section
1201 (a) (2) of the DMCA, the copyright anti-circumvention provision.1 59 They stressed that in order for copyright holders to "make their works
available in digital form without the threat of
piracy," the DMCA technological circumvention
restrictions should be enforced.1

60

The defend-

ants argued that posting and linking to DeCSS
was fair use within the meaning of the Copyright
Act. 16 1 They also asserted a First Amendment
claim, arguing that the DMCA violated freedom
of speech as it applied to computer programs or
code. 162
The District Court's Opinion FindingDeCSS a
Clear Violation of Title I of the DMCA

2.

Judge Kaplan for the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held in Reimerdes
that defendant 2600.com's posting and linking of
DeCSS computer code was a clear violation of the
DMCA, and that plaintiff MPAA was entitled to
63
both injunctive and monetary relief.'
protects motion pictures from being decrypted and copied,
or viewed on non-CSS-licensed DVD players or hard drives).
157

Id. at 312.

Id. The initial lawsuit was filed against Corley and two
other defendants who later entered into consent agreements
with the plaintiffs. 2600.com was subsequently added as a defendant in an amended complaint. See id. at 312 n.91.
'59
Eric J. Sinrod, Judge Rules Against DeCSS Download, UPsIDE TODAY, Aug. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4725619
[hereinafter Sinrod] (discussing the competing arguments
set forth in the Reimerdes case); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
160
Sinrod, supra note 159; 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
161
Id.; see also Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
162
Sinrod, supra note 159; see also Reinerdes, 111 F. Supp.
158

2d at 325-26.
"I" Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
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a. Posting and Linking to DeCSS Violates Anticircumvention Provision
The court first found that DeCSS "clearly is a
means of circumventing a technological access
control

measure.'

64

Furthermore,

the

court

ruled that if CSS fell within subsections (A), (B)
or (C) of Section 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA and
none of the statutory exceptions applied to
2600.com, defendant's posting of DeCSS violated
the DMCA.1 65 Second, the court found that CSS

effectively controls access to plaintiffs copyrighted
DVDs and falls within Section 1201 (a) (2) (A) because "in the ordinary course of its operation,
[the measure] requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to
the work."'166 Third, because the sole purpose for
creating DeCSS was to decrypt CSS, DeCSS was
designed primarily to circumvent CSS.167 Thus, by
posting DeCSS on 2600.com, the court held that
the defendants distinctly violated Section
1201 (a) (2) (A) of the DMCA. Under the same
analysis, the court concluded that the defendants
also had violated Section 1202(a) (2) (B) because
the primary purpose or use of DeCSS was to circumvent CSS.168
The defendants argued that DeCSS fell within
the reverse engineering, encryption research and
security testing exceptions to circumvention of
technological measures under Section 1201 (a) of
the DMCA. 169 Defendants argued that the reverse
engineering exception in the DMCA applied because "DeCSS is necessary to achieve interoperability between computers running the Linux op164

Id.

165

Id. at 319; 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2)(A)-(C).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318.

166

Id. at 318-19; 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) (A).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318; see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (a) (2) (B).
167
168

169 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319-21; 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (f), (g) (4), and (j).
170 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
171

Id.

172

17 U.S.C. § 1201(f); id. at § 1201(f)(3) (providing

that one who reverse engineers information may make the
information "available to others, if the person ... provides
such information solely for the purpose of enabling inter-

operability of an independently created computer program
with other programs, and to the extent that doing so does
not constitute infringement").

173 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320 (finding that the
"right to make information available extends only to dissemination 'solely for the purpose' of achieving interoperability

as defined in the statute").

eration system and DVDs.'

1 70

In rejecting this

argument, Judge Kaplan stated that the reverse
engineering exception applied only to those who
actually acquired the information that they later
reverse engineered. 17 1 Thus, this exception was

inapplicable to defendants because they did not
create DeCSS but merely posted it afterJohansen
had created it.172 Although one of the purposes
for Johansen's developing DeCSS was to build a
Linux DVD player, Judge Kaplan found that it was
not the sole purpose, as required by the reverse
engineering exception, because DeCSS was developed on Windows, a more widely used operating
system.' 73 Judge Kaplan rejected defendant's argument in applying the encryption research exception because they posted DeCSS on the Internet and were not engaged in "good faith
encryption research.' 7 4 Lastly, the judge rejected
the defendants' security testing argument because
posting DeCSS had nothing to do with testing
computers within the meaning of that subsection
1
of the DMCA.

75

On the issue of linking to other websites posting DeCSS, the court held in Reimerdes that
2600.com's linking constituted an "offering to the
public, provid[ing], or otherwise traffic[king]" in
DeCSS, violating the plain meaning of Section
1201(a)(2)

of the DMCA.

17 6

Because the

2600.com "linked to sites that automatically commence the process of downloading DeCSS upon a
user being transferred to [their] hyperlinks," defendants engaged in the "functional equivalent of
transferring the DeCSS code to the user them-

174
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (g)(2)(A)-(D). Circumvention of
technological measures is permitted in the course of good
faith encryption if:
(A) the person lawfully obtained the encrypted copy,
phonorecord, performance, or display of the published work;
(B) such act is necessary to conduct such encryption research;
(C) the person made a good faith effort to obtain authorization before the circumvention; and
(D) such act does not constitute infringement under
this title.
Id.
175 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j). The security testing provision applies when, "accessing a computer, computer system, or computer network, solely for the purpose of good faith testing,
investigation, or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability,
with the authorization of the owner or operator of such computer." Id.
176
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324; 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (a) (2) (A).
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selves."' 177 However, the court limited future link-

"[c]omputer code is expressive. To that extent, it

ing liability to parties who know that infringing
material is contained on the linked site, know that
the circumvention technology may not be offered
lawfully or use the "link for the purpose of dissem78
inating that technology." 1

is a matter of First Amendment concern. But computer code is not purely expressive any more than
the assassination of a political figure is purely a
political statement."'18 5 The "expressive element"
of code "no more immunizes its functional aspects from regulation than the expressive motives
186
of an assassin immunize the assassin's actions."
The court also noted that DeCSS is computer
code, which like the transmission of a computer
virus, has the ability to disable our nation's computer networks on which we depend. 187 Regulations of computer code are necessary because
"[t] he Constitution ... is a framework for building ajust and democratic society ...not a suicide
pact."' 8 8 Congress possesses the power to establish
content-neutral regulations that incidentally effect expression like computer code. 189 Thus the
DMCA, as applied to the posting and linking of
DeCSS, did not contravene the First Amendment.

b.

Fair Use Defense Rejected

Judge Kaplan found the defendant's fair use argument without merit in Reimerdes. The judge reasoned that defendants had not been sued for copyright infringement but for circumvention of
technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work, to which Congress
never intended fair use to apply under the Copyright Act. 179 First, the court noted that the fair use
defense to copyright infringement would be applicable only provided that the copyright holder authorized access to a copy of the copyrighted
work.'8 0 Second, Congress had delayed the effective date of Section 1201(a)(1) for two years
pending an investigation of how circumvention
could be reconciled with fair use concerns under
the DMCA." 1' Third, Congress already had created certain exceptions to Section 1201(a) analogous to fair use, such as reverse engineering, encryption research and security testing. 8 2 Lastly,
the court noted that Congress never meant for
Section 1201 to incorporate Sony and its explication of fair use.'
c.

The First Amendment: Computer Code Is Not
Pure Speech

The defendants argued that computer code is
speech, which is entitled to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment and thus is exempt from
government regulation like the DMCA.84 In response to this argument, Judge Kaplan stated that
177

178

Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
Id. at 341; see also Sinrod, supra note 159, at *2 (dis-

cussing future linking liability under the DMCA).
Reimerdes, III F. Supp. 2d at 322.
180 Id. See generally Sinrod, supra note 159, at *2 (discussing the fair use defense used in Reimerdes).
181 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
182
Id.
179

183

Id. at 324.

Id. at 304 (summarizing the defendants' position in
the Reimerdes opinion).
185
Id.
186 Id;see also Mark Hamblett, Movie Studios Score )VD Victory, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 18, 2000, at I (Col. 3) [hereinafter Ham184

3.

Analysis of the District Court's Ruling

Judge Kaplan's ninety-page opinion examining
DeCSS under the DMCA was, for the most part,
an accurate interpretation of that law. Although
his opinion expressed an obvious hostility toward
the defendants in Reimerdes and sympathy for the
copyright holders, his decision will likely be upheld on appeal on grounds of a clear public policy against hacking. The facts in Reimerdes also
seem to fit within the provisions of Section 1201
of the DMCA.
However, the opinion raises serious questions.
First, the court held that "CSS effectively controls
access to plaintiffs' copyrighted work" because "in
.the ordinary course of its operation ... [it] 'actually works' to prevent access to the protected
work."" ° Yet, the fact that the encryption technology was broken by a teenager so quickly and is
blett] (discussing Judge Kaplan's First Amendment analysis).
187
Reimerdes, II1 F. Supp. 2d at 304. See generally Sinrod,
supra note 159 (discussing the free speech argument).
188 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
189 Id.at 333. The court limited this holding to:
1) programs that circumvent access controls to copyrighted works in digital form in circumstances in which,
2) there is no other practical means of preventing infringement through use of the programs[,] and 3) the
regulation is motivated by a desire to prevent performance of the function for which the programs exist rather
than any message they might convey.
Hamblett, supra note 186.
190

Reimerdes, 11l F. Supp. 2d at 317.
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now widely available over the Internet shows that
CSS does not "actually work." Judge Kaplan ignored the fact that you cannot "unring" a bell and
a judicial decision does not stop the spread of
DeCSS on the Internet. If a technology such as
CSS does not even minimally do its job, it may not
truly be an effective measure. There are no clearcut standards for this kind of security protection
technology. Just because a company claims it has a
technology of a certain quality does not mean that
it is fool proof or that those companies are justified in accusing people of breaking their poor excuse for a protection measure. A more efficient
solution might have been to warn the MPAA to
recognize CSS' failure and to promote finding a
way to make a more effective control measure.
Second, the court found that Johansen's primary purpose for developing DeCSS was not to
make a Linux DVD player, and that "[s] ubstantial
questions have been raised both at trial and elsewhere as to the veracity of Mr. Johansen's
claim."' 19 1 However, the court never made it clear
why Johansen was not a credible witness. Moreover, the court did not explain why it was unreasonable to believe thatJohansen's creation of a Linux
DVD player was not the primary purpose of his
writing DeCSS (if the technology's primary purpose was to circumvent a technological measure,
the defendant will be liable under the DMCA). 192
In order to decrypt files on a Linux machine, Johansen originally had to encrypt the code on a
Windows computer because a Linux program at
that time did not support the file system for
DVDs. 19 3 The judge merely asserted thatJohansen
had knowledge that DeCSS could be used and
copied on computers running Windows, even
though Judge Kaplan never stated why the original Linux purpose was only secondary to evading
CSS.

194

Third, the judge described in great detail the
191
Eric Corley, Analysis of the Decision Against 2600.com,
THE HACKER Q., at http://wwvw.2600.com/news/2000/

0821.html (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Corley] (analyzing
the district court's decision against 2600.com and challengingJudge Kaplan's dismissal of Johansen's testimony).
192 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
193

Id.

194

Id.

195

Id. at 323-24.

196

Id.
Corley, supra note 191.

197

199

Id.
Id.

200

Id.

198

legislative history of the DMCA and found that
the Sony fair use defense did not apply to circumvention technology, but his analysis is inconsistent
with the statute's purpose of encouraging new
technologies. 195 Judge Kaplan casually noted that
"[a] 11 or substantially all motion pictures available
on DVD are available also on videotape. In consequence, anyone wishing to make lawful use of a
particular movie may buy or rent a videotape, play
it, and even copy all or part of it with readily available equipment."'

96

In essence, he stated that

consumers should use "old technology [not] affected by the DMCA" in order to avail themselves
of the privileges of the long-standing and highly
regarded fair use doctrine.

97

1

A fourth point is the issue of whether computer
code is speech. The district court clearly went too
far in drawing an analogy between computer code
and a political assassination. 9 A better comparison would have been to analogize the instructions
for an assassination to copying a computer program, compiling it, and executing it in its proper
setting or platform, as Corley has maintained. 9 9
This better analogy requires acting on the instructions in order to complete the task. 200 However, it
is likely that computer code will not be afforded
the same level of First Amendment protection as
pure speech. 2600.com may, therefore, be subject
20 1
to some level of government regulation.
The decision in Reimerdes also tried to achieve
the goal of scaring off hackers who have increasingly compromised the computer systems on
which our nation depends. However, in his decision, Judge Kaplan avoided the defendant's argument that "an injunction would be futile because
DeCSS is already all over the Internet."' 20 2 This
question needs to be addressed because of the Internet's pervasiveness and the ease with which
savvy computer users seem to be able to hack existing computer security codes. Facing the same
201 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)
(holding that the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and
furthering communications, does not prevent "the Government from making radio communications possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of li-

censes so as not to overcrowd the spectrum"). Thus, because
of the scarcity of radio frequencies and the uniqueness of the
radio medium, the government is allowed to put restraints
on the ability to obtain a broadcasting license. See id. at 390.
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court further found that although
broadcasting is a medium affected by First Amendment interests, differences in the characteristics of emerging media warrant differences in First Amendment standards. Id. at 386.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
202
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dilemma in the mid-1980s, the software industry
abandoned most forms of digital encryption copy
protection. 20 3 This should not suggest that the
MPAA should abandon its own vigorous efforts
for fear of hacking. However, it seems the more
copyright owners lock up the rights to their material, the more rebellious users get in trying to ac20 4
cess this material.
A decision preventing linking to DeCSS and imposing liability on one website also seems futile
due to the vastness of the Internet. The implication of a holding that equates linking to the accepted prohibition against offering pirated copies
of copyrighted material yourself could be dangerous to the Internet's future growth.2 0

5

To prove

this point, the 2600.com website currently lists but
20 6
does not link to "mirror sites" that post DeCSS.
They also provide a link to the Disney search engine, where users can search for sites that contain
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RIAA and Title II of the DMCA: A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.

1.

The Parties and Procedural History

On December 6, 1999, almost a year before
Reimerdes, the RIAA filed a suit in the U.S. District
Court for Northern California, against Napster,
Inc.2 1 I Napster is a Silicon Valley Internet startup

that facilitates peer-to-peer file sharing, enabling
its users to download MP3 files at no cost. 212 The

RIAA members alleged that Napster was liable for
contributory copyright infringement and vicariously liable for the direct copyright infringement
of its users. 213 Napster filed a motion for summary
adjudication under Section 512(a), the safe harbor provision of the DMCA, arguing that plaintiffs
were not entitled to monetary damages or injunctive relief except for narrow injunctions against

The court did not address

individual copyright infringers. 2 14 The court de-

some of these potential problems. Judge Kaplan's
decision seemed clearly pro-entertainment industry and, on appeal, consumers will need to hear a
better argument on why the freedom inherent in
these new technologies are increasingly being
taken away by powerful industry groups like the
MPAA. A final interesting note is that in a similar
suit filed in California by the MPAA to stop a website from posting the DeCSS code, the complaint
included an affidavit with a copy of the DeCSS

nied Napster's motion on May 12, 2000, holding
that Napster did not meet the requirements of

the DeCSS code.2 0

7

computer code. 20 This complaint was not filed
under seal initially. 209 Approximately two weeks

later, however, the film industry and their attorneys did request that it be placed under seal, by
which time several websites had already posted
the DeCSS code as part of the publicly available
2 10
affidavit.
203 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Kan,
Gnutella, Developer and Founder, Infrasearch, Inc.) (stating
that encryption technology seldom works, as the encryption
for Microsoft's non-MP3 digital music format, Windows Media Audio, was broken instantly after its release).
204 Lardner, supra note 6, at 56 (discussing consumer rebellion against digitally protected formats).
205 Corley, supra note 191.
206
See generally 2600.com, at http://www.2600.com (last
modified Oct. 18, 2000). "Mirror sites" are sites that
2600.com formerly posted that linked to sites containing
DeCSS code but now are merely listed on the 2600.com website. Id.
207 Id.
208 Simmons, supra note 7, at 14 (citing DVD Copy Control Assoc., Inc. v. McLaughlin, No. CV 768804, 2000 WL
48512 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000)).

Section 512(a) of the DMCA.21 5 In July 2000, the

Senate judiciary committee held a hearing on
"The Future of Digital Music" and heard testimony from key players in both the recording in216
dustry and the digital downloading industry.
On July 26, 2000, the district court granted
RIAA's motion for a preliminarily injunction
against Napster "engaging in or assisting others in
copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting,
or distributing copyrighted music without the express permission of the rights owner."2 17 The
court also ordered Napster to comply by July 28,
2000.218 In an eleventh-hour reprieve granted by

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 28,
2000, Circuit Judge Kozinski stayed the lower
209

Id.

210

Id.
A & M Recordings, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-

211

05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 12,

2000).
212

Id.

213

[d.

214

[d.

215

Id.

The Future of Digital Music: Is There and Upside to
Downloading? HearingBefore the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th
Cong., at http://senate.gov/-judiciary/7112000-ghj.htm.
216

(2000).
217

A & M Recordings, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp.

2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Id.
218
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court's injunction that would have shut down
2 19
Napster on that date.

other hosts' MP3 file libraries.2 31 Other functions

Shawn Fanning, a nineteen-year-old college student who wanted to facilitate the sharing of MP3
files over the Internet, created and incorporated
Napster in 1999.220 Before Napster, people often
used search engines, like Yahoo, to search for
websites that possibly contained desired MP3 files,
a tedious process that often lead only to "dead
links." 22 1 Fanning envisioned people sharing MP3
files directly from their hard drives with a centralized database, "combined with software that converts each user's computer into a server." 222 Currently, users can access the Napster website to
download Napster's proprietary file-sharing
software, MusicShare, free of charge.2 23 Once a
user registers and creates a user name, he or she
logs on and is connected to the database located
on Napster's website. 224 A user can search in real
time for MP3 files offered by other Napster
"hosts" through the Napster database, and also
tell it which files he or she is willing or not willing
to share.2 25 The user can locate a particular artist
2 26
or song by simply entering the particular name.

This information is transmitted to the Napster
network and in return the Napster server sends
the requesting user a list of specific MP3 file
names offered by other hosts. 227 Once a user
chooses a file to download, Napster's servers send
a message to the appropriate host, "which assumes the role of server and immediately begins
transferring the file directly to the user through
each party's respective

ISP."228

2 30

off.

A second aspect of Napster is the "hotlist" function, which permits users to access and browse

The Development of Napster

2.

tral database, which is updated as hosts log on or

Unlike MP3.com,

Napster does not store any CDs or MP3 files on its
servers. 2 29 Only the Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses for each host are stored on Napster's cen219 .A & M Recordings, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos.
00-16401 and 00-16403, 2000 WL 1055915, at *1 (9th Cir.

July 28, 2000).

of the Napster service include a chat service and a
New Artist Program, allowing signed and unsigned artists to create artistic profiles that Napster accepts only if those artists authorize sharing
of their music.

232

Napster is presently financed

solely by venture capital, and does not make any
revenue or profit. "33 Napster eventually plans to
obtain revenue through advertising, commissions
from links to commercial websites, subscriber fees
234
and direct CD sales.

Napster is considered the fastest-growing
software application ever recorded by Internet research companies. 235 Its user base quadrupled between February and July 2000.236 In June 2000,

there were approximately 600,000 MP3 files available for sharing. 237 Currently, as many as 10,000
238
music files are shared per second over Napster.

The service is growing at 200% a month, and by
the end of 2000, there are projected to be 75 million Napster users. 239 Approximately 87% of the
music available on Napster belongs to the RIAA
240
or other copyright holders.

The Parties' Initial Arguments in Napster

3.

Napster contended that it met the definition of
"service provider" under the DMCA and satisfied
the five requirements for an exemption to the
DMCA found in Section 512(a) because: (1) Napster users, not Napster itself, initiate the transmission of MP3 files; (2) the transmission occurs automatically; (3) Napster does not choose any of
the recipients; (4) Napster does not copy any of
the material during transmission; and (5) the con228

Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 760.

229
230

Id.
Id.

231

Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 906.

Id. at 759 (discussing the birth of Napster). "Dead
links" are invalid links that a search engine may lead a user to

232
233

Id. at 907.
Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 761.

where the website is either "closed or temporarily off-line."

234

Id.

220

Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 759.

221

Id.
222

Peter Svensson, Off the Charts, ABCNEWS.COM, at http:
//more.abcnews.go.com/sections/ tech/ dailynews/ napster
000911.html (Sept. 11, 2000).
235

Id.

Id. at 760.
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (discussing Napster
technology).
223
224

236

Id.

237

Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 761.
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
Id.
Id. at 903.

225

Id.

238

226

Id. at 906.
Id.

239

227

240
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tent is not modified during transmission. 24 1 RIAA

the Internet itself from the host to the requesting

argued that Subsection 512(n) of the DMCA required each of Napster's functions to be analyzed
independently of the others.2 42 When so analyzed,
all of Napster's stated functions did not fall within
the safe harbor found in Section 512(a). 24-" RIAA
also alleged that Napster did not meet the more
rigorous lack of actual knowledge standard under
Section 512(d). RIAA's principal argument was
that Napster did not perform the passive conduit

user and not through the Napster server. 25' Nap-

2
function required by DMCA Section 512(a).

44

Lastly, RIAA argued that Napster did not meet the
general eligibility requirements of Section 512(i)
for exemption from DMCA's provisions because
Napster did not discipline copyright infringers
and only adopted a copyright compliance policy
2z45
after litigation began.

ster "enables or facilitates the initiation of connections, but these connections do not pass through
the system within the meaning of [Section]
512(a). '"252 Napster thus failed to qualify for the

Section 512(a) safe harbor because it did not
transmit, route, or provide connections through
its system to hosts and individual users. The court
did not, however, rule on the applicability of Section 512(d) because Napster did not raise it as a
ground for summary judgement.25 3 Lastly, because Napster never reasonably implemented a
policy of terminating repeat copyright infringers
and Napster's copyright compliance policy was
not timely, Napster did not meet the conditions of
eligibility for relief under Subsection 512(i) of the
DMCA.

4.

Title II Safe Harbor Provision and the District
Court's Denial of Napster's Motion for Summary
Judgement

Judge Patel of the District Court for Northern
California found that Napster did not meet the requirements of Section 512(a)'s safe harbor provision of the DMCA and Napster was not entitled to
summary judgement. 246 The judge first reasoned
that Section 512(a) applied to ISPs "transmitting,
routing, or providing connections for, material
through a system" and that Napster does not perform a "passive conduit" function.2 47 Thus, the
files are not transmitted "through" the Napster
system. 248 Under the Napster system, MP3 files
are transmitted "from the Host user's hard drive
and Napster browser, through the Internet to the
'' 4
recipient's Napster browser and hard drive. 2 9

The judge also noted that Napster stressed the
passivity of its role and expressly denied that "the
transmission of MP3 files ever passes through its
servers.

' 250

In addition, the court found that the

"routing" or "providing connections" was through
241

Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *4.

242

[d.
Id.
Id.

243
244

Id.
246
Id. at *10.
247
Id. at *6 (finding legislative history of the DMCA explains that the word "conduit" means "through a system"); 17
U.S.C. § 512(a).
248
Copyrights: DMCA 's Liability Exemptions Don't Protect Online Music System From Infringement Suit, U.S. L. WK. DAILY EDITION, May 25, 2000, at d6, available at http://pub.bna.com/
245

5.

254

Analysis of the District Court's Interpretation of
Title II of the DMCA

Judge Patel's analysis of the Napster case under
Title II of the DMCA was a question of first impression. One of the potential flaws with Judge
Patel's opinion was her rigid application of Sec' 255
tion 512(a)'s definition of "through a system."
Although MP3 files never actually pass through
Napster's servers, information about a user's request for a particular recording and Napster's
subsequent facilitated response regarding host IP
addresses and availability of the material certainly
does pass through Napster. The judge also accused Napster users of sharing music with the entire world but failed to recognize that Napster is
merely a one-to-one file-sharing system. 25 6 If Section 512(a) does not apply to file-sharing services
like Napster, this narrow reading of the DMCA
could stifle other Internet ventures from using or
expanding on this revolutionary technology that
requires central data indexes to work. 25 ' Legitiptcj/9905183.htm [hereinafter U.S. L. WK.
249
Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *7.
250

Id.

251

Id. See generally U.S. L. WK.

248.
252
253
254
255
256
WIRED,
257

DAILY EDITION].

DAILY EDITION,

supra note

Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *8.
Id. at *6 n.6.
Id. at *9.
17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
SeeJohn Heilemann, David Boies-The Wired Interview,
Oct. 2000, at 255 [hereinafter Heilemann].
See, e.g., id. at 254.
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mate Internet companies need to be able to grow
unencumbered by the threat of copyright infringement lawsuits.
Moreover, in her opinion, Judge Patel noted
that although a Section 512(d) claim was not
presented by Napster, they could not rely on it as
a safe harbor because Napster had "reason to
know" of the third party's copyright infringement.2

58

However, Section 512 (d) requires an "ac-

tual knowledge" or a "red flag" standard, which is
much more than a mere "reason to know." 259 The

red flag standard is based on an ISP's subjective
awareness and "differs from previous standards,
under which a defendant may be liable for contributory infringement if it knows or should have
known that material was infringing. [The Section
512 standard] is whether the service provider'deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors
of which it is aware." 260 Even if Napster had failed
to comply with the red flag standard, it is necessary to use the proper standard in a precedentsetting case like this one. Congress could not have
intended a mere knowledge standard to apply to
the DMCA because, if ISPs do not know that their
users are engaging in copyright infringement,
there would be no third-party ISP liability under
26
the Act.

1

Lastly, the court found that Napster did not
meet the reasonably implemented policy standard
for repeat infringers required by DMCA Section
512(i)(1)(A) because Napster did not block the
IP addresses of infringing users. 26 2 However, this
2
is not a requirement anywhere in the DMCA.

63

Under Section 512(j), the only type of permissible
court injunction against a protected ISP is termination of the subscriber accounts "that are specified in the judge's] order."2 64 Napster also
claimed that, as of October 2000, it had terminated hundreds of thousands of users under the
DMCA notification procedure. 2 65 The opinion in
this case, like Reimerdes, seems sympathetic to entertainment copyright holders and pessimistic
258

Brief of Ad Hoc Copyright Coalition, Commercial In-

ternet Exch., Computer & Communications Indus. Assn',
Info. Tech. Ass'n of Am., Netcoalition.com, U.S. Internet Indus. Ass'n, and U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting None of the Parties at 16, A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, 2000 WL 1055915 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000) (Nos.
00-16401 and 00-16403).
Id. at 17.
259
260
RIGHT
261

Id. (citing

NIMMER

& D.

NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPY-

§ 12B.04[A] [1] at 12B-35 (2000)).
Heilemann, supra note 256, at 256 (discussing the

about the future of file-sharing technology in that
the judges in both cases failed to consider lawful
aspects of the technology. On appeal, Title II will
hopefully be analyzed with more emphasis on the
prospective legitimate uses of peer-to-peer file
swapping on the Internet like Napster's technology.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT'S PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AGAINST NAPSTER
A.

Napster's Second Round of Arguments

In opposition to the RIAA's requests to enjoin
Napster at least temporarily from copyright infringing activities, Napster asserted the fair use affirmative defense.2 6 6 Napster argued that the preliminary injunction would impose a prior restraint
on speech, violating its First Amendment rights
and those of Napster users and artists. 26 7 Napster
also asserted that RIAA members had misused
their copyrights and expanded their monopoly
beyond the permissible scope under the Copyright Act. 268 Finally, Napster contended that the

RIAA members had waived their entitlement to
copyright protection because they accelerated the
proliferation of MP3 files over the Internet by
seeking business partners for their commercial
downloading ventures and development of music
269
players that encouraged unauthorized ripping.
1. FairUse and Staple Article of Commerce
Affirmative Defenses Rejected
In her opinion, Judge Patel found first that the
RIAA had established a prima facie case of direct
infringement by Napster users because "virtually
all Napster users engage in unauthorized
downloading or uploading of copyrighted music." 270

Direct

copyright

infringement

was

a

threshold requirement in order for the RIAA to
prevail on liability for contributory or vicarious
Napster case and the arguments made).
262
Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *9; 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(i)(1)(A).
17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
263
264
17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (1)(A) (ii).
265
Heilemann, supra note 256, at 255.
266

Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.

267
268

Id. at 922.
Id. at 923.

269
270

Id.
Id. at 911.
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copyright infringement against Napster. Judge
Patel found next that Napster had minimal commercially noninfringing uses.2 7' In applying the
four fair use factors in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, Judge Patel opined that the purpose
and character of the illegal use was not necessarily
commercial, or personal or private because files
are sent to anonymous requesting users free of
charge by Napster. 272 The second factor cut
against Napster because the works transferred or
downloaded are creative in nature and constitute
entertainment.2 73 Thirdly, music files are generally copied in their entirety as opposed to only
portions of the works. Lastly, the effect on the potential market for the works is harmful because
CD sales at colleges are reduced and because it
raises a barrier to RIAA's entry into the digital
music Internet market.2

74

Thus, the Napster sys-

tem could not be considered a fair use of plaintiffs copyrighted works.
The court also refused to draw an analogy between Napster users "sampling" MP3 files for the
purchase of CDs in the future with the fair use of
"time-shifting" found in Sony that allowed private,
noncommercial copying of free television broadcasts using a VCR. 2 75 The VCR purchasers in Sony
merely enjoyed taped broadcasts at home while "a
Napster user who downloads a copy of a song to
her hard drive may make that song available to
millions of other individuals even if she eventually
chooses to purchase the CD. So-called sampling
on Napster may quickly facilitate unauthorized
distribution at an exponential rate." 276 The court
similarly refused to accept the proposition that
Sony "time-shifting" applied to "space-shifting," or
converting a purchased CD into MP3 format in
order to make it a more portable form of media.2

77

Even if this were considered a fair use,

"space-shifting" would not be "substantial enough
to preclude liability under the staple article of
271
272

Id. at 912.
Id.; see fair use factors, supra note 113; 17 U.S.C.

§ 107.
273 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
274
Id,
275
Id,; see also Copyrights: District Court Explains Copyright
Rulings SupportingLast Month's Napster Injunction, U.S. L. WK.
EDITION,

at d4, available at http://pub.bna.com/lw/

995183.htm (Aug. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Napster Injunction].
276 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
277
278

Id.
Id.; Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079 (holding

Rio MP3 Player, which copies MP3 files from computer hard
drives in order to make them portable-called "space-shift-

commerce doctrine.

'2 78

In refusing to apply that

doctrine, the court noted that in Sony the defendant's only participation included manufacturing
and selling VCRs. 2

79

In comparison,

Napster

"maintains and supervises an integrated system
that users must access to upload or download
files," thereby controlling and facilitating the unauthorized file sharing. 28 0 Finally, although Napster's New Artist Program and chat room services
were considered by both the court and RIAA to be
a fair use, they did not represent a commercially
2
significant aspect of Napster

2.

81

Contributory and Vicarious Copyright
Infringement by Napster

The court noted that once the RIAA plaintiffs
showed direct copyright infringement by Napster
users, in order to prevail on the preliminary injunction, they also must show a likelihood of success on the contributory copyright infringement
claim against Napster. 282 On this issue, Judge
Patel found that Napster had reason to know of
their users' direct copyright infringement based
on a document written by a Napster co-founder
who acknowledged the need to remain ignorant
of users' real names and IP addresses because
"they are exchanging pirated music.

'28 3

Napster

also received actual notice of direct infringement
from RIAA, who informed them of over 12,000 infringing files.2 8 4 Napster relied on Religious Tech-

nology Center v. Netcom Online Communication Services, Inc.2 8 5 in contending that titles in Napster's

file indexes could not distinguish infringing from
noninfringing files, and thus, Napster never knew
about copyright infringement engaged in by particular users. 28 6 The court rejected this argument,
concluding that actual knowledge of specific acts
of users' copyright infringement was not required.28 7 Unlike the bulletin board service opering"-was a fair use).
279
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.

283

Id. at 917.
Id.
Id. at 918.
Id.

284

Id.

280
281

282

907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
286 Id. (holding where a bulletin board service operator
can not reasonably verify a claim of infringement, the operator's lack of knowledge will not expose her to liability for
285

contributory infringement).
287
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
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ator in Netcom, Napster is not an ISP that acts as a
mere conduit for the transfer of files. 28 8 Finally,

the court found that Napster materially contributed to the copyright infringing activity by supplying the "proprietary software, search engines,
servers, and means of establishing a connection
289
between users' computers."
As to the vicarious copyright infringement
claim made by the RIAA, the court found that because Napster maintained that they attempted
continually to improve methods for blocking repeat infringers, Napster had basically admitted
that the company had the ability to supervise and
police the infringing activity. 290 Napster also was
found to have a direct financial interest in the
copyright infringing activity because it disclosed
future plans to "monetize" its user base even
29 a
though Napster currently receives no revenue.
In conclusion, the court found that RIAA had a
reasonable likelihood of success on both its contributory and vicarious infringement claims
292
against Napster.
3.

The Rejection of Napster's First Amendment
Challenge, Misuse of Copyright Defense and
Waiver

Napster argued that the First Amendment afforded protection for its file directories. 293 Because Napster offers an electronic directory that
does not actually contain copyrighted material,
the preliminary injunction would impose a prior
restraint on Napster users' free speech.2 9 4 The
court rejected this argument, finding that the
First Amendment is coextensive with the fair use
doctrine.2 95 The court also held that RIAA members did not seek to enjoin any of Napster's fair
uses, and that Napster could separate the infringing and noninfringing parts of its services in order
to avoid a complete shut down. 29 6 Judge Patel furId.
Id. at 919-20 (analogizing Napster to the contributory liability of the swap meet operators selling musical recordings in Fonovisa who provided parking, booth space, advertising and clientele).
290
Id. at 920-21.
291
Id. at 921; see also NapsterInjunction, supra note 275, at
d4.
292
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920-22.
293
Id. at 922.
294
Id.
295
Id.
296
Id. at 922-23.
297
Id. at 923.
288
289

ther rejected Napster's misuse of copyright defense because although Napster cited cases dealing with enlarging copyright monopolies through
licensing, RIAA members never granted Napster a
license to the music files being distributed over its
network.29 7 Lastly, Napster's argument that RIAA

had waived an entitlement to copyright protection was rejected because the court found that
RIAA did not invite "wholesale infringement
when they distributed a small number of free MP3
29 8
files for promotional purposes."
4.

The District Court's Conclusions in Napster

The court found that, because the RLAA
showed "a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits of their contributory and vicarious copyright infringement claims" against Napster, they
were entitled to a presumption of irreparable
harm. 299 Furthermore, predictions about a preliminary injunction's impact on Napster was pure
speculation in comparison to the massive amount
of unauthorized use of RIAA's copyrighted works
300
by allowing Napster to continue its operations.
The court thus enjoined Napster from facilitating
others in the free copying of both plaintiffs' copyrighted works in this suit and those not yet
30
named. '
B.

Analysis of the District Court's Decision to
Enjoin Napster's Operation

Judge Patel's decision "disregarded the Supreme Court's caution that the judiciary should
be reluctant to expand copyright protections without explicit legislative guidance when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials."3 0 2 Such a decision threatens
manufacturers of digital technology and discourages the development and use of new kinds of InId. at 923-24.
Id. at 925.
o300 Id. at 926.
301
Id. at 927.
302
Brief for the Consumer Elec. Ass'n, The Digital Future Coalition, and the Computer and Communications In298
299

dus. Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal at 3, Napster, Inc. v. A & M Records, Inc., 2000 WL 1055915 (9th Cir.
July 28, 2000) (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellant]; Sony, 464 U.S. at 431 (holding that
"[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations
alter the market for copyrighted materials").
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ternet technology. 11 3 However, the primary flaw
in this opinion is that the judge unconstitutionally
expanded the copyright holders' monopoly over
their copyrighted works, giving them control over
something they do not directly control.11

4

First,

Judge Patel misapplied the staple article of commerce doctrine from Sony because she assumed
that if a technology is primarily used for copyright
infringement, none of the other uses could be
considered commercially significant. 30 5 Under
Sony, the technology "need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses," and a court then
must consider both actual current uses and all the
future "different potential uses" of the technology, not simply current actions by users of the
technology.3 16 Regardless of the other Napster
uses, such as sampling and time-shifting, the court
held that "Napster's primary role of facilitating
the unauthorized copying and distribution [of]
established artists' songs renders Sony inapplicable." 30 7 The court further disregarded the Ninth

Circuit's holding in Diamond Multimedia that the
AHRA protects the home taping of "all noncommercial copying by consumers of digital and analog musical recordings," not merely certain types
of noncommercial reproductions.3 0 8
Next, Judge Patel found that the sharing of music where artists have authorized copying and distribution. of their works through Napster "may not
represent a substantial or commercially significant
aspect of Napster" because it was not a key aspect
of Napster's initial business plan.30 9 However, the
Sony standard was meant to be a forward-looking
flexible test, considering all of the many potential
uses of the technology in order to allow it to "mature and realize future lawful uses."3 10 In Sony, the
Supreme Court found that the VCR met the "capable of substantial noninfringing use" standard
because: "(a) consumers could record programming that either was not copyrighted or whose
owners did not object to the recording; and (b)
unauthorized time-shift recording for subsequent
viewing was fair use."3 '1 Yet, the Sony Court found
303

304
305
306
307

308

Brief for Appellant, supra note 302, at 3.
Heilemann, supra note 256, at 256.
Id. at 255; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis ad-

ded).
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Napster, 114 F. SIpp. 2d at 917.
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Brief for Appellant, supra note 302, at 8.
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that only 7.3% of the programming was considered nonobjectionable, or authorized by copyright holders.3 12 Thus, imposing contributory liability on Napster would be unfair to those who
appreciated time-shifting as a means to enlarge
the audience for their works.3 13 Whereas, in Napster, the court found that 87% of the works on
3
Napster are copyrighted, while 13% are not.

14

The court in Napster disregarded the fact that the
authorized copying and distribution of an artists'
works as a way to expand one's audience may be
substantial fair uses of these works and are far
from insignificant.
Third, the court in Napster found that Sony was
different because Napster "exercises continuing
control over its service[,]" but that was not a requirement to be proved under the Sony fair use
doctrine.3 1 5 The Napster court, on the other hand,

found that Napster never exercised control over
the selection and transmission of files by its
users.3 1 6 The court also held that Napster could
avoid copyright liability if it modified its service to
avoid the possibility of infringement, another aspect of copyright doctrine not required under
Sony.3" 1 7 The court in Napster applied the staple article of commerce doctrine more strictly than the
Sony Court intended and Judge Patel refused to
accept the instruction that courts "be circumspect
in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated
such a calculus of interests."'3

18

In essence, Judge

Patel's opinion in Napster discourages innovation
by Internet companies who fear copyright litigation might shut them down.
C.

Finding a Solution for Napster in the
Online Copyright Debate Over the
Distribution of Digital Entertainment
Content

For years, it has generally been opined that record companies charge inflated prices for their
products, with most of the revenue ending up in
"I

Id. at 9-10.

S12
"13
4'

Sony, 464 U.S. at 424.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 302, at 10.
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03.
Id. at 916.

316

Id. at 907.

317

Id.

314

3418

at 915-16.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
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the hands of corporate executives, as opposed to
the very artists who create the copyrighted
works.3 19 Record companies, as the middlemen,
have retained control over the distribution of
these works as a type of weapon against their artists. The Internet threatens this balance of control. The recording industry holds stubbornly to
the retailing model where people are actually
purchasing CDs when, in reality, people are now
downloading MP3s. Physical promotion and distribution of music has essentially "peaked in economic terms." 320 Both the Reimerdes and Napster
opinions reflect this point by masking what the
judges believe protects copyright holders, while
they are actually sustaining an outdated industry
model in which the record and film executives,
not the artists, are the main profiteers. 32 1
As the lines continue to blur between various
media of communications in the digital age, the
recording industry would be smart to try to learn
from and work with the Napster distribution
model. Online music distribution has proven to
be a more efficient means of delivery to consumers, something that the record companies should
322
be attempting to promote and not destroy.
This is because online distribution gives artists the
chance to reach their audiences directly while recording industry companies have an opportunity
to reduce their marginal costs of distribution to
almost zero. 32 3 An alternative to the extreme sanc-

"recogniz [ing] the popularity of listening to music [online] while acknowledging the property
rights of the recording industry." 324 RLAA members would be better ceasing this seemingly endless litigation that will continue against other similar online ventures if a court order shuts down
Napster.
The recurring theme throughout the Napster
case is that even if Napster is shut down, there will
always be other music trading services ready to
take their place and they will be just as difficult to
police. 3 25 Although companies like Scour.com, "a

Napster-like Windows program" that is a kind of
"easy-to-use AOL for filesharing," has laid off most
of its staff due to legal threats by the RLAA, there
are other similar, but decentralized and anonymous services like Gnutella and Freenet that will
be harder for the RLAA to sue. 326 Gnutella will
most likely be the first program people download
if Napster is shut down. 327 With Gnutella, once

someone downloads the software, "a 'hello' message is sent to a computer that is already on the
network, which forwards it to seven others, letting
them know that the first computer is on board...
[t] hey in turn, forward it to six more, which forward it to five more and so on." 328 A particular

request percolates through the Gnutella network
and when it reaches a computer that has the file,
the message percolates back to the initial requesting computer, making the original person who re-

tions imposed against Napster might be
319

Martin Peers, States Sue Record Firms Over CD Pricing

Policies,WALL ST.J., Aug. 9, 2000, at B7. On Aug. 8, 2000, the
Attorneys General from 30 states and commonwealths filed a
federal lawsuit against five record companies and three retail

music chains for allegedly conspiring to fix prices of CDs,
costing consumers hundreds of millions of dollars. Under a

minimum advertised price ("MAP") policy established by record companies in the mid-1990s to end CD price wars, discount retailers were forced to charge a fixed price for CDs or
lose millions of dollars from promotional payments from record companies. In May, the Federal Trade Commission settled with five of the major record labels who agreed to stop
MAP policies for seven years, without having to admit wrongdoing. Id.
320
Hearings,supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Hoffman,
Jr., Founder, President and CEO, EMusic.com, Inc.).
321 Editorial, Overkill on MP3, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10,
2000, at F6 [hereinafter Overkill on MP3],; Voegtli, supra note
89, at 1241 ("[lIt is not uncommon for the total earnings

from derivative works to exceed movie ticket sales, and companies, like the Walt Disney Company, have successfully ex-

ploited derivative rights to generate considerable profits.").
Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Kan,
Gnutella, Developer and Founder, Infrasearch, Inc.).
323
Id. (discussing the reasons artists and recording com322

panies can benefit from digital music); Gaffney, supra note
12, at 629 ("[T]he combination of low-cost perfect copying

with electronic distributive networks such as the Internet allows for widespread dissemination of high-quality copies at
very low overhead costs.").

Overkill on MP3, supra note 321.
See Heilemann, supra note 256, at 258 (discussing the
inevitability of other online peer-to-peer file-sharing service).
324
325

Napster also has demonstrated that if the file-sharing central
index technology were located offshore in another country,
the United States would not have the power to stop the Napster-like services from emerging. Id.
326
New DivX is the MP3 of Movie Swapping: But Expects

Frustrations-TheRevolution Is Still in Early Beta, TIME DIGITAL,
at http://www.time.com/time/digital/daily/0,2882,5281 1,
00.html (Aug. 17, 2000); see alsoJanelle Brown, The Gnutella

Paradox, RED HERRING COMM., at http://www.redherring.
com/insider/2000/1002/tech-off-salon-gnutella100200home.html (Oct. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Brown] (discussing

the popularity of Gnutella on the Internet and Gnutella's future legal situation if Napster is shut down).
327

Brown, supra note 326.

Karl Taro, Meet the Napster, TIME DIGITAL, at http://
www.time.com.time/magazine/articles/0,3266,55730328

5,00.html (Oct. 2, 2000).
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quested the file essentially anonymous.

329

The

problem with Gnutella is that in order to get onto
the network there needs to be other users, and in
order to find a particular file there needs to be a
significant number of users on board. 33 0 Furthermore, because there is no central server, there is
no technical support or hotline to give technical
33 1

assistance to its users.
Lastly, the software is a
"work-in-progress" and is still flawed. 33 2 However,

it will be difficult for the RIAA to bring legal action against Gnutella because it is not restricted to
MP3 file sharing. -4 Gnutella also has no central
server and because Gnutella is merely a protocol,
there is no one entity responsible for its existence
33 4
on the Internet and thus, no company to sue.

Regardless, RIAA members are hinting that they
33 5
are strategizing a legal attack on Gnutella
The best example of a compromise between the
RIAA and companies that are in the gray areas of
copyright law like Napster, MP3.com and
Gnutella, is EMusic.com. 336 EMusic.com offers
the Internet's largest catalog of downloadable
MP3 music available for purchase, offering over
100,000 MP3s by signed artists.3 3 7 Through licens-

ing agreements and relationships with artists,
EMusic.com sells individual tracks for ninety-nine
cents and entire downloadable albums for
$8.99.

33

The most attractive part of the technol-

ogy is the "EMusic Unlimited" subscription service
that offers unlimited MP3s for download at $9.99
per month for a full year or $19.99 for one
month. 33 9 Thus, under the EMusic.com model,
artists are still paid royalties while consumers are
offered reasonable download prices for music
they enjoy. 3 40 The EMusic.com model drives con-

sumers to feel less cheated and more willing to
pay. This rational solution to consumer demand
would effectively put a stop to the RLAA's lock and
key mentality to its music.
Recognizing the benefits of the EMusic.com
330

Id.
Id. (discussing the problems with Gnutella).

331
332

Id.
Id.

329

3
See generally What is Gnutella?, at http://www.gnutellanews.com/information/what-isgnutella.shtml (last visited
Jan. 10, 2001) (describing how the Gnutella service and
software work).
334

Id.

Brown, supra note 326.
See generally EMusic.com, at http://www.emusic.com
(last modified Oct. 20, 2000).
337 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Hoffman,
Jr., Founder, President and CEO, EMusic.com, Inc.).
335

336
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model, on October 31, 2000, Bertelsmann AG,
the parent company of RIAA member BMG Entertainment and the fourth-largest music company in the U.S., struck a deal with Napster to develop a new subscription-based distribution
service in exchange for an undisclosed investment
in Napster. 341 Under the alliance, BMG will with-

draw from the RIAA copyright infringement lawsuit against Napster "once the service has reconfigured itself to pay royalties to Bertelsmann's
artists through pay-for-play subscription fees" at
approximately $4.95 a month. 342 However, the
terms of the agreement are unclear, including
how the company plans on monitoring the songsusers' downloads and how revenue will be shared
with other labels that decide to join. 34 3 The deal
also came as a surprise to Sony, Universal, Warner
and EMI, the four other major RLAA companies,
and it is far from certain that they will commit to
the endeavor. 344 Finally, the Napster-Bertelsmann
deal will not end the lawsuit filed by the RIAA
against Napster and depending on the outcome
of the appeal, the new partnership could be extin3 45
guished if Napster is ordered to shut down.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the entertainment industry seems to
be winning the initial battles in the war against
the unauthorized copying and distribution of
copyrighted digital music and video over the Internet, their resistance to technological change
may end up costing them the war. These early victories that strengthen the law in favor of copyright
holders should be seen as a temporary restraining
wall until the entertainment industry accepts the
new realities of technology and adjusts the way
they distribute digitally copyrighted works. Although the Reimerdes case may be upheld on appeal for public policy reasons, the proliferation
338

Id.

See generally EMusic Unlimited, at http://
www.emusic.com/subscription/index.html (last modified
Nov. 18, 2000).
340 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Hoffman,
Jr., Founder, President and CEO, EMusic.com, Inc.).
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Sales; BerteLsmann to Quit Industry Lawsuit, TilE
POST, Nov. 1, 2000, at Al.
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with which DeCSS has flourished over the Internet makes the decision somewhat infeasible in
reality. Even if 2600.com is banned from posting
or linking to DeCSS on its particular website,
DeCSS will continue to exist all over the Internet.
Although Napster's future does not look promising and Napster may soon be shut down by court
order, the legitimacy of certain uses for online file
swapping might still be upheld. However, even if
Napster is shut down, its progeny are right behind
them, ready to take Napster's place. Those websites may be hard to find, police and subsequently
difficult to sue. While the MPAA is looking for
better encryption technology and the RIAA is trying to establish its own encryption technology in
order to remain competitive, these industry

'109

groups should focus on taking advantage of the
new business opportunities of digital distribution
over the Internet. The more industry continues to
lock up copyrights and expand monopolies over
their copyrighted works, the more consumers will
fight back by using online distribution outlets like
Napster. In the end, it is up to the entertainment
industry to decide whether or not they want to
work with such new technologies that are embraced by the American public. If they don't find
a resolution soon or work toward furthering these
innovative technologies, the Shawn Fannings and
Jon Johansens of this world will take control of
the Internet and essentially make copyright laws
moot.

